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Abstract. The LUC cryptosystem is a modification of the RSA cryptosystem based on
Lucas sequences. In this paper we extend the Verheul - van Tilborg and Dujella variants
of the Wiener attack on RSA to the LUC cryptosystem. We describe an algorithm for
finding a secret key d of the form d = rqm+1 ± sqm, for some m ≥ −1 and nonnegative
integers r and s, using continued fractions. We derive bounds for r and s using results on
Diophantine approximations.
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1. Introduction
In 1978, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [13] introduced the first practical public–
key cryptosystem. This cryptosystem is called RSA. The modulus n of the RSA
cryptosystem is the product of two different large primes p and q. The public
exponent e and the secret exponent d are related by ed ≡ 1 (mod (p− 1) (q − 1)).
In 1993, Smith and Lennon [14] described a new public–key cryptosystem based
on Lucas sequences. The public key is (n, e). The modulus n is the product of two
different large primes p and q, and the public encryption key e is relatively prime to
the product (p− 1) (q − 1) (p+ 1) (q + 1).
The public encryption key e and the secret decryption key d are related by
ed ≡ 1 (mod S (n)), (1)
where there are four possible values for the function S (n):
lcm (p− 1, q − 1) , lcm (p− 1, q + 1) , lcm (p+ 1, q − 1) , lcm (p+ 1, q + 1) .
In 1990, Wiener [16] described a technique to use continued fractions in a cryptan-
alytic attack on an RSA cryptosystem with a small secret exponent, which is called
the Wiener attack. Wiener showed that if d < n0.25, then this technique deter-
mines d, p and q, since the secret number d is the denominator of some convergent
pm/qm of the continued fraction expansion of e/n. His result is based on the classical
Legendre’s theorem on Diophantine approximations of the form
∣∣α− ab ∣∣ < 12b2 .
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In 1999, Boneh and Durfee [3] described an attack on RSA with a small secret
exponent d which works if d < n0.292. This attack is based on Coppersmith’s method
[4] for finding small roots to polynomial equations, which is based on the LLL–lattice
reduction algorithm. In 2001, Blo¨mer and May [2] proposed a variant of the Boneh
and Durfee attack.
In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg [15] extended the boundary of the Wiener
attack on RSA. They propose a technique to raise the security Wiener’s boundary
of n0.25 with exhaustive-searching for 2t+ 8 bits, where t = log2 d− log2 n0.25. The
candidates for the secret key d are of the form d = rqm+1+sqm, for some nonnegative
integers r and s.
In 2004, Dujella [5] described a new variant of the Wiener attack on RSA. His
attack is a modification of the Verheul and van Tilborg variant, and it is based on
the Worley result on Diophantine approximations [17] of the form |α− a/b| < c/b2,
where c is a positive real number. The candidates for the secret exponent d are of
the form d = rqm+1 ± sqm, for some nonnegative integers r and s.
In 1995, Pinch [12] extended the Wiener attack to LUC and KMOV cryptosys-
tems, and showed that both cryptosystems with 1024-bit modulus n are insecure for
a 256-bit private key d. Note that KMOV is also similar to RSA. This cryptosystem,
proposed by Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto and Vanstone [10], uses elliptic curves over
the ring Zn, and its security is based on the difficulty of factoring large integers.
KMOV cryptosystem with a 1024-bit modulus n is factoring-secure. Ibrahimpasˇic´
[7] showed that in this case, KMOV cryptosystem is insecure for a 270-bit private
key d.
In this paper, we generalize the above mentioned attacks which use continued
fractions. We extend the Dujella variant of the Wiener attack to the LUC cryptosys-
tem and describe an algorithm for finding a secret key d, where d = rqm+1 ± sqm,
for some nonnegative integers r and s. We will show that the LUC cryptosystem
with a 1024-bit modulus n is insecure for a 270-bit private key d. We derive bounds
for r and s using results on Diophantine approximations [5, 17].
2. Lucas sequences
Let a and b are nonzero integers and α and β the roots of the equation











where ∆ = a2 − 4b.
Lucas sequences (Un) and (Vn) (n ≥ 0) are given by
Un (a, b) =
αn − βn
α− β and Vn = α
n + βn.
In particular,
U0 = 0, U1 = 1, V0 = 2, V1 = a,
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and for n ≥ 2 we have
Un = aUn−1 − bUn−2,
Vn = aVn−1 − bVn−2 .
Note that if a = 1 and b = −1, then Un (1,−1) are the Fibonacci numbers
(0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, . . .), and Vn (1,−1) are the Lucas numbers (2, 1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 18,
29, 47, . . .).
We have the following relationships [14] between the Lucas sequences Vn, which
are easy to prove using the definitions of Un, Vn,∆, a and b in terms of α and β:
V2n = V 2n − 2bn, (2)
V2n−1 = VnVn−1 − abn−1, (3)
V2n+1 = aV 2n − bVnVn−1 − abn, (4)




2Vn+m = VnVm + ∆UnUm, (6)
2bmVn−m = VnVm −∆UnUm. (7)
In further work we need the following relationship [1, 14]
Vn
(
Vk (a, b) , bk
)
= Vnk (a, b) ,
which for b = 1 gives
Vn (Vk (a, 1) , 1) = Vnk (a, 1) .
3. LUC cryptosystem
The LUC cryptosystem is based on Lucas sequences, and it is developed in analogy
with the RSA cryptosystem. Suppose n and e are two chosen numbers, where n is
the product of two large different primes p and q. The number e must be chosen so
it is relatively prime to (p− 1) (q − 1) (p+ 1) (q + 1). Let M be a message which is
less than n and relatively prime to n. We obtain the ciphertext C by
C = Ve (M, 1) mod n.
The public number e and the secret number d are related by (1) where













The Legendre symbols are either +1 or −1 which imply that there are four
possible values for S (n) = lcm (p± 1, q ± 1) .
Since the choice of public number e ensures that it is relatively prime to S (n),
the secret number d can be found easily by the extended Euclidean algorithm. The
decription process is then the same as encryption, with e replaced by d. We have
M = Vd (C, 1) mod n.
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which implies [14, 11]
UkS(n) (C, 1) ≡ UkS(n) (M, 1) ≡ 0 (mod n),
VkS(n) (C, 1) ≡ VkS(n) (M, 1) ≡ 2 (mod n).
Now, we can easily check that the inverse of the encryption function Ve (M, 1) is
the decryption function Vd (C, 1) (see [14] for the details).
Computation of Ve and Vd might look extremely long, for large values of e and
d. But, in [14] it is shown how this problem can be solved by a modification of the
successive doubling technique (see [6, Algorithm 5] or [9, Chapter 4.6.3]).
4. Cryptanalysis of the LUC cryptosystem with a short secret
exponent
The security of the LUC cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of finding the secret
key d. It was believed that finding a secret key d from public keys e and n is
computationally equivalent to factoring a composite number n.
In this paper we are only interested in attacks using continued fractions. Let
α = [a0; a1, a2, . . .] be the continued fractions expansion of a real number α. The
convergents pmqm of the continued fraction expansion of α, satisfy p0 = a0, q0 = 1,
p1 = a0a1 + 1, q1 = a1 and pi = aipi−1 + pi−2, qi = aiqi−1 + qi−2, for i > 1.
In 1990, Wiener [16] proposed a polynomial time algorithm for breaking a typical
RSA, where p and q are of the same size and e < n. He showed that if p < q < 2p,
e < n and d < 13n
0.25, then d is the denominator of some convergent of the continued
fraction expansion of e/n, and therefore d can be computed from the public keys n
and e. In 1997, Verheul and van Tilborg [15] proposed an extension of the Wiener
attack, which can work well over Wiener’s boundary. The candidates for the secret
exponent d are of the form d = rqm+1 + sqm, for some nonnegative integers r and s.
In 2004, Dujella [5] described a modification of the Verheul and van Tilborg variant of
the Wiener attack. This attack is very similar to the Verheul and van Tilborg attack,
but instead of an exhaustive search after for finding the appropriate convergent,
this variant also uses estimates which follow from Diophantine approximations [5,
Theorem 1].
Theorem 1 (Dujella, Worley). Let α be a real number and let a, b be coprime





where c is a positive real number. Then (a, b) = (rpm+1 ± spm, rqm+1 ± qm), for
m ≥ −1 and for some nonnegative integers r, s such that rs < 2c.
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In 1995, Pinch [12] extended the Wiener attack to the LUC cryptosystem, and
here we extend the Dujella variant of the Wiener attack to the LUC cryptosystem.
We assume that p < q < 2p and let d = D · 4√n. The following lemma can be
easily proved.
Lemma 1. Let p, q be two distinct positive odd integers, such that p < q < 2p, and
n = pq. Then
(i) 2
√
n < p+ q < 2.1214
√
n,
(ii) 1.9999 < q − p < 0.7072√n.
4.1. Case S (n) = lcm (p− 1, q − 1)
From ed ≡ 1 (mod lcm (p− 1, q − 1)) there exists an integer K such that
ed = K · lcm (p− 1, q − 1) + 1.
If we let G = gcd (p− 1, q − 1) and use the fact
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We have two possibilities depending on whether the inequality pm+2qm+2 ≥ kdg is satisfied
or not.
1. CASE: In the first case we assume that pm+2qm+2 <
k
dg . We have∣∣∣∣ en − kdg
















sqm+2 − tqm+1 ,
where m ≥ −1, and r, s and t are nonnegative integers satisfying inequalities
rs < 4.2438D
2g2
G and st < 4.2438
D2g2
G .
If we search for kdg among the fractions of the form
rpm+1+spm
rqm+1+sqm
, we have the
system
k = rpm+1 + spm,
dg = rqm+1 + sqm .
The determinant of this system is pm+1qm − pmqm+1 = − (−1)m+1 = −1, and
therefore, the system has positive integer solutions:
r = dgpm − kqm,
s = kqm+1 − dgpm+1 .
If r and s are small, then they can be found by an exhaustive search. Let us find
upper bounds for r and s. From [8, Theorem 9 and 13], we obtain
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Then

























































2.1219 (am+3 + 2)
. (9)









dg (am+2 + 1)
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<
dg (am+2 + 1)
√






































































= dgqm+1 · pmqm+1 − pm+1qm
qmqm+1










dg (am+1 + 1)
qm+1
<
dg (am+1 + 1)
√











In this case we obtain




Inequalities (10) and (11) immediatelly give the bounds for the number of possible
pairs (r, s). However, the bounds can be improved by combining them with the








Also, we have that s ≤ s1, where s1 =
⌊





, and s1 =
⌊√
2.1219 (am+2 + 2) (am+1 + 1) Dg√G
⌋








. We have the following upper bound for the num-
ber of possible pairs (r, s):
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G (1.5 + ln (0.7072 max (A,B)))
< 4.2438 D
2g2




am+2 (am+3 + 2) and B =
√
am+2 (am+2 + 2) (am+1 + 1) .
Let P (ai = q) be the probability that the partial quotient ai, of the real number α,
is equal to q, when α is chosen at random. Then we have the following formula [9,
p. 368]




(q + 1)2 − 1
)
. (12)
We have that the success of this attack depends on the size of corresponding partial
quotients am+1, am+2 and am+3. From (12) we have that these partial quotients are
usually small, but we can exclude the possibility that at least one of them is large.
We obtain the following experimental results (which are in good agreement with
theoretical results which follow from (12), assuming that ai are independent)
P (max {A,B} ≤ 13) = 0.5135, (13)
P (max {A,B} ≤ 104) = 0.9002 . (14)
If we take 1000000 randomly chosen pairs of prime numbers p and q, such that
1010 < p, q < 1050, then we obtain the following results. In 50% cases we have
G = 2, and in 90% cases we have G ≤ 18. By these results and (13), in 25% cases
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we have G = 2 and max {A,B} ≤ 13, which imply that in 25% cases the upper
bound for the number of possible pairs (r, s) is 31.5616D2. Also, in 81% cases we
have G ≤ 18 and max {A,B} ≤ 104. Thus, in 81% cases the upper bound for the
number of possible pairs (r, s) is 442.8992D2.
We have the same upper bounds for the number of possible pairs (s, t).







and similarly to the first case we have
r′ = dgpm+2 − kqm+2,






































































































< 0.1540 · Dg√
G
.
Hence, we have the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs (r′, s′)
r′s′ <









We will now consider how one could test whether a guess of k and dg is correct.





, while a guess
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of g is edg mod k. The guess of (p− 1) (q − 1) can be used to create a guess of p+q2




n− (p− 1) (q − 1) + 1
2
.
If the guess of p+q2 is not an integer, then the guess of k and dg is wrong. The guess














− n . (15)





is a perfect square, then the original guess of k and dg is
correct. The secret key d can be found by dividing dg by g. Recall that g is the















Example 1. Let us take 25-digits number n = 1338871137782389210296931 and e =
106154303640063475571633 . The first 16 partial quotients of the continued fraction
expansion of e/n are
[0, 12, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 982, 7, 1, 4, 18, . . .] ,


































































By applying the above described test, we find that s = 209 and t = 2 gives the
correct value for secret key d (i.e. for k and dg). We have d = 34535381, and
p = 936938270533, q = 1428985430407.
If we compare these numbers s and t with the numbers r and s obtained by an
application of the Verheul and van Tilborg attack to the same problem, we have the
same number s = 209, but the other number r = 205236 is much greater than the
number t = 2.
Example 2. Let n = 881542675172451959659. Among 1000000 trials with a ran-
domly chosen private key d, such that 13n
0.25 < d < 109 · 13n0.25 we have the fol-
lowing results. In 991847 (99.18%) trials we have that pm+2qm+2 <
k
dg . The value of
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min{rs, st} is equal to rs in 491974 (49.20%) cases, and it is equal to st in 499873
(49.99%) cases. The maximal value of these minimums is 7872119858569929382
and it is attained for d = 56718771847943. The average value of min{rs, st} is
8388052160310987713.27. The maximal value of G·min{rs,st}D2g2 is 4.0363 and it is at-
tained for d = 56718771847943. The average value of these minimums for d in the
given interval is 0.8455.
In 8153 (0.82%) trials we have that pm+2qm+2 ≥ kdg . The maximal value of products
r′s′ is 1081631134948304523, and it is attained for d = 38407030686079. The av-
erage value of these products is 5611757083137645.76. The maximal value of Gr
′s′
D2g2
is 0.0762 and it is attained for d = 12320751623657. The average value of these
products is 0.0193.
4.2. Case S (n) = lcm (p+ 1, q + 1)



























As in Section 4.1, we have two possibilities depending on whether the inequality
pm+2
qm+2
≤ kdg is satisfied or not. In the first case we can assume that pm+2qm+2 > kdg . If
pm+1
qm+1
− en > 2.1216en√n , then we have
r <
√




s < 2 ·
√








If pm+1qm+1 − en ≤ 2.1216en√n , then we have
r <
√














Thus, we obtain the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs (r, s),




(1.1536 + ln (max (A,B))) .
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In the second case we assume that pm+2qm+2 ≤ kdg and obtain
s′ <
√











< 0.1539 · Dg√
G
.










, and of g is edg mod k. We can determine




(p+ 1) (q + 1)− n− 1
2
.
Example 3. Let us take again n = 1338871137782389210296931 and now e =
223201031770339258802723. In this case we have m = 2, s = 947366288, t = 207




3997 · 947366288− 666 · 207
23976 · 947366288− 3995 · 207 .
Finally, we obtain d = 22714053294123 and p = 936938270533, q = 1428985430407.
4.3. Case S (n) = lcm (p+ 1, q − 1)



























dg and assume that
pm+1
qm+1
− en > 0.7072en√n . We obtain
r <
√




s < 2 ·
√
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If we assume pm+1qm+1 − en ≤ 0.7072en√n , then we have
r <
√


















(1.1536 + ln (max (A,B))) .
Let pm+2qm+2 ≤ kdg . In this case we have
s′ <
√




r′ < 1.4566 · Dg√
G
,
and we obtain the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs (r′, s′)

























+ n . (17)
Example 4. Let us take again n = 1338871137782389210296931 and now e =
148338118876659391215397. In this case we have m = 4, s = 1009345869, t = 256




75989 · 1009345869− 75834 · 256
685862 · 1009345869− 684463 · 256 .
Finally, we obtain d = 346135900590775 and p = 936938270533, q = 1428985430407.
4.4. Case S (n) = lcm (p− 1, q + 1)
In this case we have
1.9999e


























dg and assume that
e
n − pm+1qm+1 > 0.7074en√n . Then we have
r <
√




s < 2 ·
√








If we assume en − pm+1qm+1 ≤ 0.7074en√n , then we have
r <
√














In this case we obtain the following upper bound for the number of possible pairs
(r, s), and also (s, t), 1.4148 D
2g2
G (1.1536 + ln (max (A,B))) .
If we have pm+2qm+2 ≥ kdg , then we obtain
s′ <
√




r′ < 1.4566 · Dg√
G
.










, and of g is edg mod k. Factors p and q can




n− (p− 1) (q + 1)− 1
2
.
Example 5. Let us take the same n = 1338871137782389210296931 and now e =
293598101817010770384145. In this case we have m = 17, s = 46041557, t = 120




343149 · 46041557− 89285 · 120
1564834 · 46041557− 407159 · 120 .
Finally, we obtain d = 36023672473729 and p = 936938270533, q = 1428985430407.
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Example 6. Let n = 881542675172451959659. Among 1000000 trials with a ran-
domly chosen private key d, such that 13n
0.25 < d < 109 · 13n0.25, we compare the
obtained results in three cases, depending on function S (n). We consider function
S in the form S (n) = lcm (p− 1, q + 1), lcm (p− 1, q + 1) and lcm (p− 1, q + 1),
respectively.
In 990587 (99.06%), 893373 (89.34%) and 882391 (88.24%) trials, resp., we ob-
tained k and dg with pairs (r, s) and (s, t). More precisely, min{rs, st} is equal to rs
in 488275 (48.83%), 393932 (39.39%) and 383390 (38.34%) trials, and it is equal to
st in 502312 (50.23%), 499441 (49.94%) and 499001 (49.90%) trials. The maximal
values of these minimums are
721090380565428735 (d = 342804871054489) ,
125268491259184839 (d = 334161510529429)
and
326408359472540736 (d = 56974579771127) .
The average values of these minimums are
1425002034008237123.16, 705703219014797180.45 and 15886594335277959.27.
The maximal values of G·min{rs,st}D2g2 are
4.0330 (d = 299225532498339) ,
0.8205 (d = 329534695410043)
and
0.7977 (d = 54342302187019) ,
and the average values are 0.8561, 0.1899 and 0.1841.
In 9413 (0.94%), 106637 (10.66%) and 117609 (11.76%) trials we obtained k and
dg with pairs (r′, s′). The maximal values of products r′s′ are
1063899527763072894 (d = 300078163615589) ,
1241778639590097406 (d = 104182591660513)
and
86705428719975975 (d = 55869596982065) ,
and the average values are 1425002034008237123.16, 705703219014797180.45 and
15886594335277959.27. The maximal values of Gr
′s′
D2g2 are
0.0708 (d = 49908237142041) ,
0.2038 (d = 278995224797287)
and
0.2218 (d = 23630365395965) ,
and the average values of these products are 0.0208, 0.0486 and 0.0500.
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Note that the LUC cryptosystem with a 1024-bit modulus n is factoring–secure.
In this case, Pinch [12] showed that the LUC cryptosystem is insecure for a 256-bit
d. We have implemented the attack described in this paper in the computer algebra
system PARI/GP (on a 3.0GHz – Pentium under Windows XP). It works efficiently
for D ≤ 214. More precisely, an implementation of this attack needs on average
around one hour for D ≤ 213 and around 5 hours for D ≤ 214. Thus, we conclude
that our attack shows that the LUC cryptosystem, with a 1024-bit modulus n, is
insecure for a 270–bit secret key d.
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